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ABSTRACT
This research explores the usability of the Federal Communication Commission’s 
(FCC’s) online Public Inspection Files to measure the sources and quantities of 
political advertising on broadcast television. We compared data from FCC files 
with data purchased from a commercial vendor in a presidential caucus campaign 
that stretched across nine months, including advertising sponsored by over 40 
groups and totaled tens of millions of dollars. The FCC-derived and commercial 
data were consistent in reporting the quantity of advertising, but sponsor identi-
fication was inconsistent between data sources, raising concerns about the FCC’s 
ability to disclose reliable information about political ad spending.
Keywords: political ad spending; transparency in election spending; FCC data 
policy; FCC online public inspection file system 
The US Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. FEC sharpened 
concerns about the dominant role that corporate wealth and special 
interests can play in the electoral process through financing political 
advertising.1 The Citizens United ruling invalidated parts of the Bipartisan 
Campaign Finance Reform Act (2002) and was contrary to the Court’s 
previous decisions in McConnell v. FEC and Austin v. Michigan Chamber 
of Commerce. Although the Court’s decision in Citizens United found 
restrictions on the amount of corporate spending on election campaigns 
to be  unconstitutional, it let stand disclosure provisions in order to pro-
vide information to  voters. Consequently, the quality of publicly accessible 
data about political advertising is of critical importance to understanding 
1. See Blevins; Levi; and Levitt.
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the role that corporations and other private interests play in the electoral 
process.
One of the remaining forms of public oversight of financial influence2 
in political advertising is the FCC’s requirement that broadcasters disclose 
information about their political ad sales through each broadcast station’s 
online Public Inspection Files. It is important to more fully understand the 
accessibility and accuracy of this information.
The study that we present here focused on advertising during the Iowa 
caucuses to test the usefulness and validity of the FCC Public Inspection 
Files as a source of political advertising data. We compared data derived from 
the FCC with data purchased from a commercial vendor, Kantar’s Campaign 
Media Analysis Group, for $19 million of advertising spending over 9 months 
by 40+ political advertisers. This is the first comprehensive, peer-reviewed 
study of FCC-derived data and offers critical insights for public interest 
groups, campaign finance reform advocates, and media researchers.
Measuring Political Advertising: Federal Election Commission, 
Kantar, and the FCC
For media researchers and public interest groups, the usefulness and valid-
ity of political advertising spending measures are both key factors to under-
standing the power that money plays in the election process. Although 
there are multiple sources of data for researchers to collect political adver-
tising data, including two federal commissions and a private company 
that tracks political advertising, there are significant limitations to each, 
including lack of detail, cost, and usability of the data. In this section, we 
examine how the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and Kantar Media’s 
Campaign Media Analysis Group measure political advertising in election 
campaigns and the limitations of both sources. Additionally, we explore the 
potential for the FCC’s public file system as a free alternative source of data 
for researchers who want a detailed gauge of spending on political adver-
tising. Table 1 provides a comparison of the three sources by data origins, 
units of analysis, media covered, media not covered, costs, and timeliness.
2. Financial influence may come from a variety of sources, including corporations that form 
traditional PACs, as well as wealthy individuals who are making the donations to super PACs 
and 501c organizations.
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table 1 Political Advertising Data Suppliers
FEC Kantar FCC
Message source Candidate commit-
tees, political action 
committees, and 
other groups
Candidate commit-
tees, political action 
committees, interest 
groups
Candidate commit-
tees, political action 
committees, interest 
groups
Advertising quantity Advertising expendi-
tures in dollars
Number of ads, 
length of ads, esti-
mated cost of ads
Number of ads, 
length of ads, cost 
of ads
Markets NA National, 210 
Nielsen markets, 
plus Manchester, 
New Hampshire 
during presidential 
election cycles
All
Media All expenditures Network TV, local 
broadcast TV, 
network cable, local 
radio
Local broadcast TV, 
local radio*, local 
cable**, DBS***, 
SDARS****
Reporting 
mechanism
Self-report by groups Electronic monitor-
ing of signals
PDFs of contracts, 
uploaded by 
broadcasters
Unit of analysis Invoice Individual spots Advertising contracts
Research access cost Free Negotiated with 
Kantar, or available 
from Wesleyan 
Media Project for 
nominal fee fol-
lowing 2- to 4-year 
embargo
Free
Blind spots Quantity of 
advertising in units 
other than dollars, 
markets purchased, 
ad creative
Local cable, outdoor, 
print, small markets 
not monitored on 
fulltime basis
National, online, 
print, outdoor, ad 
creative
Notes: *Political advertising reports for radio stations with five or more employees in the top 50 markets 
only began in 2016, and all other radio stations begins in 2018.
**Local cable systems with 5000 or more subscribers, began in 2016, and cable systems with 1000–4999 
 subscribers begin in 2018.
***Direct broadcast satellite services (e.g., DirecTV, Dish).
****Satellite digital audio radio service (e.g., SiriusXM).
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Political Advertising Spending Measures
Data Source: Federal Election Commission
The Federal Election Campaign Act (1971) requires political candidates and 
committees that register with the FEC to keep records of contributions and 
expenditures that influence the nomination or election of candidates for 
federal office. Additionally, as still provided under FEC rules, the law man-
dated that the source of funding shall be disclosed for all advertising from 
campaign committees, political action committees (PACs), individuals, or 
other organizations that “expressly advocates for the election or defeat of a 
clearly identified candidate.”3 The primary purpose of requiring disclosure in 
political advertising was to reduce deception and other forms of corruption 
in the electoral process without inhibiting political speech or campaigning.
Such disclosure requirements survived a constitutional challenge in 
Buckley v. Valeo as the Court reasoned that disclosure requirements are the 
least restrictive means affecting political speech by providing information 
to voters about which interest groups that elected officials are most likely 
to be receptive toward while in office.
The level of detail within the FEC reports tends toward the vague. 
Candidates and committees can choose to fill in a “purpose of disburse-
ment” field with any level of specificity. The FEC accepts “brief but 
 specific” descriptions of disbursements such as “advertising—radio, TV, 
newspaper, or print” as meeting its disclosure requirements.4 There are no 
requirements to disclose the number of ads or when the ads were run. 
Additionally, if the disbursement was made to a representative firm that 
sells advertising time on multiple media entities, then the station or chan-
nel receiving the advertising funds are not necessarily identified. In spite 
of the low degree of specificity, the FEC files have been used for political 
science research.5 However, the lack of detail in FEC filings seems to pre-
clude its use in all but the most large-grained analyses. Arguably, the FEC 
filings are better employed for reviews of strategic political decisions, and 
of limited use for explorations of campaign tactics.
3. See Federal Election Campaign Act.
4. See Federal Election Commission.
5. For instance, Stratmann used FEC filings, as well as industry-data on advertising rates, to 
establish the efficacy of advertising purchases in congressional races. Hernnson also used FEC 
data to estimate overall media spending in congressional elections.
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Data Source: Kantar Media Campaign Media Analysis Group
The dominant6 supplier of political advertising data in the United States 
is the Washington-based Campaign Media Analysis Group of Kantar 
Media (hereafter referred to as “Kantar”).7 Owned by the world’s largest 
 advertising-agency-holding company, London-based WPP, Kantar is an 
operation within WPP’s Data Management Investment Group. WPP does 
not break out revenues for individual operations, but the 2016 WPP Annual 
Report tallied £2.61 billion (approximately $3.41 billion USD) in revenue for 
the Data Management Investment Group, a significant portion of WPP’s 
overall revenue of £14.34 billion (approximately $18.76 billion USD).8 Clients 
for the Kantar Campaign Media Analysis Group include advertising agencies, 
political parties, political action committees, and advocacy groups.9
Kantar tracks political advertising in the United States on network tele-
vision, local television, network cable television, and radio. Their coverage 
area includes the 210 Nielsen markets, plus Manchester, New Hampshire, 
during the presidential primary season.
Kantar does not publish a description of its advertising monitoring 
mechanism. However, discussions with Kantar personnel and a review of 
the data provided indicate that Kantar electronically monitors web feeds 
of television broadcast stations with software separating program content 
from advertising. The advertising content is broken into discrete spots, 
with a digital example of each different spot linked to a database. Kantar 
reports 26 variables for each spot, including the station name, program 
title, date and time of air, and spot length. Some of the more subjective ele-
ments of each spot are derived through human coding. Coders at Kantar 
review the spot, assign the name of the advertiser (e.g., “American Future 
Project”), a campaign (e.g., “President”), an issue (“Faith/Religion”), and 
a tone (“Positive”). Each spot is assigned an estimated cost. From discus-
sions with Kantar personnel, the estimated cost is derived from discussions 
6. Other suppliers of political advertising data include Nielsen’s Ad Intel (http://en-us. 
nielsen.com/sitelets/cls/adviews.html#Resources) and iHeart Media’s Media Monitors (http://
www.mediamonitors.com). Additionally, Echelon Insights (https://echeloninsights.com) 
and Advertising Analytics (https://advertisinganalyticsllc.com) extract data from the Federal 
Communication Commission (FCC) online public inspection files for sale to commercial and 
political clients.
7. Kantar’s main office is in New York, whereas the CMAG is headquartered in 
Washington, DC.
8. See WPP.
9. See WPP Operating Units.
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with advertising buyers and sellers, and reference to political advertising 
contracts in the FCC Public Inspection File system.
Researchers can access Kantar data through multiple mechanisms. Data 
can be purchased on a near real-time basis directly from Kantar. The com-
pany does not publish a rate card, but per-market costs are in the multiple 
thousand-dollar range. Aggregate data is offered in summary reports from 
advocacy organizations that have agreements with Kantar, such as Public 
Integrity during and after election cycles, but Kantar prohibits purchasers 
from sharing raw data.
For researchers wishing to analyze raw data, but without financial 
resources, the Wesleyan Media Project10 offers downloads of Kantar polit-
ical advertising data for a nominal fee. The Wesleyan Media Project began 
tracking campaign advertising following the 2010 election cycle using 
Kantar data, and offers databases for Presidential, Senate, House, and 
some state-level races. The Wesleyan Media Project is the successor to the 
Wisconsin Advertising Project, which tracked advertising in 75 markets 
(eventually rising to 210 markets) beginning with the 1998 election. The 
Wisconsin Advertising Project concluded with the 2008 election.
Kantar data through the Wesleyan Media Project is embargoed until 
the end of the following election cycle. For example, the 2016 presidential 
election data is unavailable until the conclusion of the 2020 election. Data 
for US Senate and House elections, as well as governorships and “down 
ballot” races, are released two years following the election. For example, 
data for 2016 House and Senate races will be available following the 2018 
elections.11
Use of Kantar Data via Wisconsin and Wesleyan Projects
There is an extensive history of researchers using Kantar data. Besides a 
book-length review of election advertising practices,12 Kantar data was used 
in studies of how political advertising is targeted,13 deception in campaign 
advertising,14 the prevalence of messages in the environment,15 and message 
10. See Fowler, Franz, and Ridout.
11. Wesleyan Media Project.
12. See Fowler, Franz, and Ridout.
13. See Ridout et al.
14. See Winneg et al.
15. See Neiheisel and Niebler.
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content.16 The video content that Kantar archives with the data was used 
to track the proportion of male versus female narrations in campaign ads.17 
Recently, Kantar was one of the data streams in a “Big Data” approach to 
political incivility in social media.18
The FCC’s Station Public Inspection File system
Because the broadcast medium has historically been the key mechanism 
by which candidates and political groups get their messages to voters, the 
FCC has oversight over an important aspect of political ad spending that 
falls under the Communications Act (1934). The FCC collects information 
on political advertising purchases made on licensed broadcast television 
stations in the United States in accordance with the Communications Act, 
which requires that broadcast stations provide reasonable access and equal 
opportunities for candidates running for federal office to purchase adver-
tisements. However, the “equal opportunities” rule provided in Section 315 
of the Communications Act does not provide an equal amount of adver-
tising time for all candidates running for the same office. What the law 
does require is that stations make available the same opportunities (length 
of ad, day part, cost, etc.) to all legally qualified candidates running for the 
office. For example, if a television station sells a block of 60-second ads in 
primetime to one candidate, it has to be willing to sell the same number of 
ads, at the same length, for the same cost to other candidates in that race.
Specifically, FCC rules 73.3526(e)(6) and 73.3527(e)(5) require that 
television and radio stations keep a file of “all requests for specific sched-
ules of advertising time by candidates” and issue advertisers, as well as 
information about when the ads actually aired “as soon as possible, which 
the Commission has determined is immediately absent extraordinary cir-
cumstances.”19 The information is provided by the stations and consists 
of requests for airtime by candidate committees, National Association of 
Broadcasters affidavits self-certifying the organization as representing a 
political entity, and the advertising contracts as generated by the station or 
the station’s sales representation firms.
16. See Fowler, Ridout, and Franz.
17. Strach et al.
18. See Hopp and Vargo.
19. FCC, About Public Inspection Files.
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The requests, affidavits, and contracts are uploaded to the FCC Public 
Inspection File system in Adobe PDF format. Although the PDF format 
allows viewers to inspect the documents using any computer, the opportu-
nity for automated data interpretation is limited. Additionally, the struc-
ture and file name of each document is up to the purchaser, the station, 
or the sales representative firm, further limiting the opportunity for auto-
mated data interpretation. As noted in its frequently asked questions, the 
FCC specifically declines to offer naming conventions for broadcasters’ 
Public Inspection Files, stating: “there is no requirement that individual 
files be named in any particular way.”20 The absence of standardization 
makes interpretation of files more subjective and error-prone.
In a critique of the FCC’s system for tracking political ad buys, the Center 
for Responsive Politics concluded that the agency’s efforts were “useless” for 
the public to understand who was advertising.21 The primary shortcoming of 
the FCC’s public file system is that stations do not necessarily know how to 
code ads from interest groups, which leads to inconsistency and inaccuracy in 
the data. The FCC file structure provides a folder for “Non-candidate Issue 
Ads,” and it’s up to each station to determine what constitutes an issue ad. 
A further problem is that the FCC’s file system is only searchable by station 
call letters, rather than a particular candidate or the entity purchasing ads. 
Together, these two problems make it a painstaking task to discover ad spend-
ing by 501(c) 4 groups, also known as “dark money.” Because these groups do 
not register with the FEC, the only public mechanism to find dark money is 
through the FCC Public Inspection Files on a station-by-station basis.
Research Using the FCC File System
For decades, the FCC has required broadcast stations to maintain physical 
files that include documents such as applications, licenses, letters, Equal 
Opportunity reports, and key for this study, documents relating to politi-
cal advertising. Until the FCC’s mandated transition to the online system, 
the files were available to the public and researchers only in visits to the 
offices of the broadcast stations.22
20. Ibid.
21. See Kim.
22. For instance, a few researchers have used the on-site files. Tyrie and Clift traveled to 31 
cities to evaluate the availability and usage of the file system. Prior visited television stations in 
Columbus, Ohio to count the runs of political ads as a mechanism for improving the validity 
of content analyses. A larger study by West et al., compared national advertising purchases with 
local ad buys in four markets with data obtained through station visits.
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The transition to the online Public Inspection Files23 had the potential 
to increase the volume of research, as investigators could access the files 
without the time and expense of trips to stations. However, we were able 
to find only two studies that used the political files within the online FCC 
system as a data source.24
Research Questions
In sum, our review of the research based on the three data sources (FEC, 
Kantar, FCC) indicates an ongoing interest in tracking the sources and 
quantities of political advertising. FEC data is freely accessible, but 
reported in such a way as to limit its usefulness for measuring political 
advertising tactics. Kantar Media and the FCC Public Inspection Files are 
what remains. However, the reliance on purchased Kantar data, and the 
scant employment by researchers of freely available FCC data, indicates 
a perceived or actual lack of viability for the FCC Public Inspection File 
system as a source for research data.
Accordingly, this study explored the suitability of the FCC files for 
tracking political advertising. We first report the usefulness of the FCC 
Public Information Files as a research tool, evaluating the accessibility and 
cost of “free data” in terms of researcher time. We then explore the extent 
to which political ad data from the FCC and Kantar Media deliver consis-
tent results, focusing on the source and amount of advertising purchased. 
If data can be extracted efficiently from the FCC system, and the data 
paint a valid picture of political advertising expenditures, researchers will 
have methodological and budgetary choices.
(RQ1): To what extent is the FCC Public Inspection File system a viable 
supplier of political advertising source and quantity data?
(RQ2): To what extent is the FCC Public Inspection File system file a 
valid indicator of political advertising source and spending?
23. See Federal Communications Commission, “Public Inspection File Demo.”
24. In her doctoral thesis, Moshary took an econometrics approach to argue that a price 
differential existed for airtime purchased by supporters of different political parties that could 
not be distinguished by any quality other than the party preference of the purchaser. To conduct 
the analysis, she reviewed advertising contracts from stations in 19 markets. The second study 
was an analysis by the Campaign Legal Center of 1220 political advertiser identification forms 
filed with 240 stations in four markets, finding errors or omissions in 35% of the filings. See 
McGehee and Moran.
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.218 on Tue, 15 Jan 2019 21:08:58 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
426        JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY
Method: A Data Comparison Approach
This current research involves a comparison of broadcast commercial 
 advertising source and quantity as uploaded to the FCC Public Inspection 
File system with Kantar Media’s capture of presidential advertising for the 
same campaign and market. FEC data were not analyzed, as invoices could 
not be efficiently ascribed to a single market. We chose a single market and 
single time period: Des Moines, Iowa, during the nine months of advertising 
for 2016 Presidential Caucus. This market seemed appropriate for a test of 
source and quantity of political advertising, as the Iowa Caucuses host one of 
the largest numbers of candidates vying for inclusion in the later stages of the 
campaign, and those candidates, plus super PACs and other organizations, 
purchase enough advertising to saturate the broadcast schedule with political 
advertising, pushing out all but a limited amount of local advertising.25 The 
multi-month campaign, the extensive number of candidates, political action 
committees and interest groups, as well as the number of ads run created an 
environment suitable for a test of the FCC’s Public Inspection file system.
The coding of FCC Public Inspection Files was conducted in cooper-
ation with the Investigative Reports unit of one of the state’s newspapers, 
which used the data for a series of articles on political advertising spending 
in Iowa’s eight Nielsen markets. Television call signs for each of the  markets 
were determined using the Television Bureau of Advertising (TVB) mar-
kets and stations list. Advertising contracts from full-power broadcasting 
stations were entered. Excluded were public television stations, low power 
stations, station translators, and stations not selling advertising.
Contracts were entered for both candidate committees and noncan-
didate organizations. As many contracts were updated as the campaigns 
progressed, only the final version of each contract was analyzed.
A trained student coder inspected each contract, recording the con-
tract number as applied by the advertising time seller, the advertiser, 
start/stop dates, gross cost, and number of spots. Coding for advertising 
running between June 1, 2015 and February 1, 2016, the date of the Iowa 
Presidential Caucuses, began in October 2015 and ran through the first 
week of February 2016.
The coders were assisted by a semiautomated Google Sheets spread-
sheet.26 Programming within the spreadsheet extracted the station name 
25. See Pfannenstiel and Kummer.
26. A sample Google Sheets with data is posted at https://bit.ly/2CbW5MW.
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from the URL of the contract in the FCC system, and automatically 
referenced the station market from an FCC station reference list. Pull-
down menus within the spreadsheet referenced the most recent list of 
political advertisers (sources) as published by the political advocacy group 
OpenSecrets.org, thus standardizing the source name and spelling.
FCC Public Inspection Files: Somewhat Usable, Highly Correlated 
to Commercial Data
This research compared data extracted from the FCC station files with data 
purchased from Kantar for the purchasers of the ads, the number of ads 
purchased, the television stations running the ads, and the cost of the ads.
Through the end of the Iowa Caucuses, there was approximately $46 
million in political advertising spending related to the presidential cam-
paigns in the eight media markets in Iowa. For the Des Moines mar-
ket alone, Kantar reported “seeing” 28,738 ads with an estimated value 
of approximately $17.8 million. Kantar listed 39 different advertisers (in 
our analysis, termed “Sources”) in the Des Moines market, with Hillary 
Clinton, Right to Rise USA, and Bernie Sanders top spenders. The analysis 
of FCC data used OpenSecret.org’s presidential political advertiser list,27 
of which 32 were active in the Des Moines market. Within the FCC data, 
there were 29,213 ads contracted. Hillary Clinton, Right to Rise USA, and 
Bernie Sanders were also the top spenders.
Timeliness of FCC Data
The FCC does not set a deadline for stations to upload political advertising 
contracts, instead asking stations to upload contracts “as soon as possi-
ble,” which an FCC document has interpreted as “immediately.”28 For this 
research, the lag time between contract availability and upload to the FCC 
was calculated as the difference, in days, between the start of the ads called 
for in the contract and the date of the upload to the FCC system. Among 
the 1175 contracts analyzed, upload dates ranged from 154 days in advance 
of first air to 147 days after the first spot in the contract aired. Overall, the 
27. See Center for Responsive Politics.
28. See supra note 15.
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mean time to file was 10.2 days (standard deviation [SD] = 44.37). The two 
stations with the most contracts in the market each averaged less than a 
week, whereas stations with fewer contracts typically, but not always, were 
later in their uploads, with as much as a five-week lag (see Table 2).
The average ten-day lag between air and contract upload may have little 
impact upon academic researchers. Additionally, our analysis may have 
overstated the lag time, as we measured the time between air and the final 
revision of the contract. Contracts can be revised and uploaded multiple. 
Lag times might have been shorter had we analyzed the first upload, rather 
than the last. In sum, the FCC Public Inspection File system appears to 
provide timely data for all but the most time-sensitive research projects.
The Cost of Free FCC-Derived Data
The PDF files in the FCC system provide images of station documents. 
Extracting data from the image was a challenge. First, the coder had to find 
the most recent contract in a folder that contained multiple documents, 
including a National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) questionnaire 
establishing the source and scope of the campaign, requests for airtime, 
invoices, and several revisions of the contract. There was no format stan-
dardization from contract to contract between and within stations. The 
PDF format and absence of standardization precluded using technology to 
capture the information locked within the contract, and required human 
review of each contract at each revision. Time constraints also limited the 
amount of information that could be captured from each contract. For 
instance, contracts typically included the names, dates, and times of the 
table 2 FCC-Derived Presidential Advertising on Des Moines Broadcast Stations
Station Contracts Ads Spending ($) Report Lag* SD
KCCI 412 7872 9,155,629 6.46 40.67
KCWI 104 1713 133,064 −5.53 59.10
KDSM 174 3847 1,144,518 35.47 36.86
WHO 313 9691 7,790,609 3.98 42.89
WOI 172 6090 1,527,724 14.23 42.24
Total 1175 29,213 19,751,544 10.17 44.37
Notes: Data covers June 2015 to February 2016.
*Report lag is mean number of days between first airing of spots in a contract and upload of data to the 
FCC file system. Negative numbers indicate mean number of days in advance of first air.
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programs in which ads were scheduled to air, as well as the length of the 
ads. As the research program was interested in the source and quantity 
of political ads, and uninterested in scheduling issues, program informa-
tion was not captured, and would likely have substantially increased the 
amount of time needed for entry of each contract.
Coders were students drawn from a 32-person advertising media 
class. The course focused on political media, and data input and analy-
sis were integrated into the syllabus. The class members were assisted by 
five politically interested students and two reporters from the collabo-
rating  newspaper’s investigative reports team. For the entire project, stu-
dents coded 3786 contracts for the eight markets. In a postcourse survey 
(N = 21, 58 percent response rate), students reported coding, on average, 
62.6 files each (SD = 28.97). Each coder invested an average of 3 minutes 
per file on coding (SD = 2.63), with a range of 1–10 minutes per file.
Our initial research question focused on the viability of the FCC 
Public Inspection File system as a supplier of data for academic studies. 
Our experience, based on one long-running, multi-advertiser, multi- 
market, media-saturated campaign, was positive. Based on the three-min-
ute data-entry average, the entire team of coders spent approximately 60 
 person-hours entering the FCC data. Although the coders were unpaid, 
had they been paid professional data-entry rates, the total cost would have 
been only a fraction of the purchase price of Kantar data.
Thus, in response to the first research question, data from FCC Public 
Inspection File system can be a viable choice for scholars for studies of 
broadcast television advertising in which the number of markets, the num-
ber of campaigns, and/or the amount of captured detail, are limited to a 
subset of races and markets in the United States.
The Validity of FCC-Derived Data
The second research question addressed the extent to which the FCC data 
is a valid representation of the source and amount of political advertising 
spending. The face validity of the measures, such as the source name on 
contracts, the call letters of the broadcaster, the number of ads purchased, 
and the cost of the ads, is high. The FCC-derived data and Kantar mate-
rials for the sources of advertising, number of ads, and the cost of the 
advertising were compared to assess the convergent validity of the FCC-
derived data. There is confidence among researchers, as evidenced by their 
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continued use of Kantar data, that Kantar accurately represents political 
advertising activity. Accordingly, this research employed Kantar data as the 
comparison set to assess the validity of the FCC-derived data.29
The analytic process consisted of combining Kantar Media’s presidential 
advertising report for the Des Moines market (28,738 records), delivered 
as an Excel file, with an Excel file containing the 1174 contracts derived 
from the FCC Public Inspection Files. Source (advertiser) names were rec-
onciled for multiple candidates and organizations. Both Kantar and sta-
tions occasionally used unstandardized short titles for source names. For 
example, while Hillary Clinton’s committee was officially titled “Hillary 
for America,” Kantar Media listed “Clinton, Hillary,” whereas television 
station contracts showed a mix of titles such as “Clinton for President” 
and simply “Clinton.” For this analysis, source names were standardized 
to match candidate committees and organizations listed as advertisers by 
Opensecrets.org. In addition, several candidates and organizations failed to 
appear in both the 39-source Kantar Media database and the 32-source FCC-
derived data. For example, Kantar Media tracked spots from “Californians 
for Population Control,” while advertising from that organization was not 
captured from the FCC-derived data. Combined, there were 43 undupli-
cated sources. All were retained for this analysis (see Table 3).
29. For a discussion of convergent validation, see Adcock and Collier.
table 3 Comparison of FCC-Derived and Kantar-Reported Presidential Advertising by 
Source
Source FCC spots FCC dollars ($) Kantar spots Kantar dollars 
($)
America Next 191 150,510 185 326,690
America’s Liberty 
PAC
80 141,200 91 75,070
American Encore 0 0 64 87,940
American Future 
Project
127 114,729 188 66,560
Americans United 
for Chang
0 0 17 29,830
Believe Again 1044 976,745 930 1,284,490
Bernie 2016 5415 2,417,107 5406 2,071,320
(Continued )
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Source FCC spots FCC dollars ($) Kantar spots Kantar dollars 
($)
Californians 
for Population 
Stabilization
0 0 134 32,740
Carly for 
President
208 145,025 199 51,210
Carson America 1,865 831,782 1,813 831,080
Chris Christie for 
President
24 9,729 17 7,970
Club for Growth 
Action
177 293,100 185 443,260
Conservative 
Solutions PAC
854 1,416,125 801 945,250
Conservative 
Solutions Project
393 613,870 357 605,940
Cruz for President 1,053 599,443 985 473,170
Donald J. Trump 
for President
1,193 545,775 1,257 531,730
ESAFund 17 54,550 140 80,960
Foundation 
for a Secure 
and Prosperous 
America
0 0 104 35,720
Future45 4 9,695 4 7,350
Generation 
Forward
42 69,550 41 49,790
Gilmore for 
America
0 0 25 15,510
Hillary for 
America
7,653 3,566,414 7,737 3,576,090
Huckabee for 
President
0 0 25 15,510
Jeb 2016 122 34,305 0 0
Kasich for 
America
0 25 15,510
Keep the Promise 
PAC
118 389,775 132 244,370
table 3 Comparison of FCC-Derived and Kantar-Reported Presidential Advertising by 
Source (Continued )
(Continued )
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Source FCC spots FCC dollars ($) Kantar spots Kantar dollars 
($)
Lawrence Lessig 
for President
104 40,658 104 23,600
Lindsay Graham 
2016
0 0 25 15,510
Marco Rubio for 
President
3,358 1,675,770 1,802 973,010
National Draft 
Ben Carson 
for President 
Committee
18 20,750 0 0
Opportunity and 
Freedom PAC
1,855 358,535 1,797 523,420
Our Principles 
PAC
91 136,710 154 79,350
Pataki for 
President
0 0 1 6,580
Purple PAC 114 150,345 296 244,100
Pursuing 
America’s 
Greatness PAC
184 456,585 362 267,620
Rand Paul for 
President
0 0 26 12,140
Right to Rise 
USA
2,080 3,269,737 2,445 2,765,560
Security is 
Strength PAC
96 84,130 84 111,540
Seldon Henry 4 19,000 0 0
Stand for 
Principle PAC
31 87,750 516 394,570
Stand for Truth 438 763,200 0 0
Unintimidated 
PAC
259 307,445 264 486,800
Willie Wilson 
2016
1 1500 0 0
Grand Total 29,213 19,751,544 28,738 17,808,860
Note: Data covers broadcast television in the Des Moines media market, June 2015 to February 2016.
table 3 Comparison of FCC-Derived and Kantar-Reported Presidential Advertising by 
Source (Continued )
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The number of ads and the cost of the ads as measured by Kantar and 
reported to the FCC were submitted twice, by source and station, to 
paired sample t-tests (Davis 1997). Typically, t-tests are used to determine 
if two samples have different means. In this analysis, the absence of mean 
differences between the Kantar data and the FCC data was considered an 
indicator of convergent validity.
FCC and Kantar Data Statistically Indistinguishable
For the number of ads run by each of the 43 sources, paired samples t-tests 
found no significant differences at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) between the 
FCC and Kantar data for the number of ads purchased by each source 
(t = 0.663, ns) and the amount spent by each source (t = 1.357, ns). In terms 
of which of the five Des Moines stations ran the ads, paired sample t-tests 
showed no difference between FCC and Kantar for the number of ads run 
on each station (t = 0.264, ns) and the revenue generated by those ads (t = 
0.454, ns). In sum, the lack of differences between the two sources, with 
Kantar data collected electronically on a per-spot basis and the FCC data 
collected manually on a per-contract basis, indicated a convergent validity 
for both data collection mechanisms (see Table 4).
Indistinguishable, But Not Identical
Although the Kantar and FCC-derived data are highly correlated, 
the differences in line-by-line results (See Table 3) illuminate the 
table 4 Correlations by Sources (N = 43) and Stations (N = 5)
FCC spots FCC dollars Kantar spots Kantar dollars
FCC Spots 0.875**N = 43 0.983**N = 43 0.884**N = 43
FCC dollars 0.870 N = 5 0.872**N = 43 0.976**N = 43
Kantar spots 0.997**N = 5 0.848 N = 5 0.908**N = 43
Kantar dollars 0.885*N = 5 0.967**N = 5 0.868 N = 5
Notes: Upper right correlations for sources, bottom left correlations for television stations.
*Indicates correlations significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
**Indicates correlations significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
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methodological challenges of measuring political advertising sources and 
quantities. The  FCC-derived data recorded contracts for 29,213 spots, 
whereas the Kantar system captured just under 28,738 spots. For 33 of the 
43 advertisers assessed during the caucus period, the difference between 
the FCC and Kantar data was less than 100 spots per advertiser. The fewer 
spots seen by Kantar versus contracted in the FCC data could be due to 
unreported spot cancellations.
Overall, there were 17 cases in which the FCC data reflected more spots 
than seen by Kantar. Those could have been due to identification errors 
or cancellations not reported to the FCC. There were 23 cases in which 
Kantar reported more spots than contracted by the FCC. Those could be 
explained by identification errors, stations running more spots than con-
tracted or making good for partial or interrupted runs of spots, or stations 
not reporting advertising buys. However, the difference between the total 
number of spots reported as purchased to the FCC and seen by Kantar 
amounted to 2 percent.
On occasion, there were larger discrepancies, most notably the 1556 
spot difference for Marco Rubio’s presidential committee. The FCC-
derived data listed 3358 ads as contracted, with only 1802 seen by Kantar’s 
monitoring. The difference cannot be explained by miscoding super PAC 
spots, as the FCC and Kantar data were in close agreement for the Rubio-
supporting super PACs, with a 53 spot underreporting to the FCC for the 
Conservation Solutions PAC and a 36 spot underreport to the FCC for the 
Conservative Solutions Project.
Turning to the dollar value of the spots, the FCC-derived data indi-
cated almost 10 percent more spending than Kantar. The difference can 
be attributed in part to the data collection mechanisms. As television sta-
tions do not typically post rate cards and spot costs are dynamic,30 Kantar 
estimates the dollar value of each spot captured by their recording system, 
using an undisclosed estimation mechanism. The FCC-derived data, based 
on amounts agreed to by the advertising sellers and purchasers, would be 
expected to be closer to actual spending than Kantar.
The most substantial divergence between the Kantar and FCC data is in 
the naming of advertisers (sources) in the presidential campaign. Although 
there was no question between Kantar and FCC for presidential commit-
tees, the numerous super PACs and interest groups represented a defini-
tional challenge. Kantar identifies political spots, and assigns advertiser 
30. See supra note 20.
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names, through visual inspection of the advertising creative, whereas the 
FCC system is dependent on sources properly identifying their goals on 
paperwork filed with each station. The system is prone to identification 
errors, and identification of sources is at the heart of public monitoring of 
campaign financing.31 For example, Californians for Population Growth 
was not captured by the FCC data, although Kantar recorded 134 ads. In 
general, both campaign committees and PACs purchasing small numbers 
of ads were more likely to be missed in the FCC data than by Kantar, with 
Rand Paul, George Pataki, and John Kasich among those with no reports 
to the FCC but a few airings captured by Kantar.
The FCC as a Data Supplier: Discussion and Limitations
This research explored the viability of the FCC Public Inspection File 
system as a data source for political science research. Accordingly, in our 
discussion we first review the usability of the system and the validity of 
its data. We then discuss the limitations of the FCC as a monitor of polit-
ical advertising activity, and then outline the limitations of our analytic 
approach.
Based on the files from television broadcasters captured in this study, the 
FCC system provides a usable data source on political advertising activity 
on broadcast television. Reports in the form of PDFs of advertising pur-
chase contracts uploaded from television stations can be interpreted by 
system users to show the source and amount of advertising.
The stations in this study did a commendable job of reporting political 
advertising purchases. Contracts were uploaded, on average, only a few 
days after the start of the advertising buy, and many were uploaded prior 
to the start of advertising. Our comparison between the FCC self-reported 
data and Kantar’s machine-based monitoring indicates that the FCC 
 system captured nearly all of the political advertising, with a portion of the 
difference explainable by difficulties in assigning and categorizing source 
names. The greater number of ads in FCC-derived data versus Kantar’s 
monitoring indicates that stations are compliant in reporting purchases. 
Were stations failing to report political advertising purchases, we would 
expect to have seen lower numbers for ads from FCC-derived data versus 
Kantar’s electronic monitoring.
31. See McGehee.
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However, usability was constrained by the FCC’s reliance on the PDF 
file format and the absence of consistency in contract formats. Each con-
tract had to be reviewed by a human coder, increasing the time-cost and 
opportunity for coding error. However, even at commercial data-entry 
rates, the cost of hand-entering FCC data amounted to a fraction of the 
purchase price of Kantar data. Although Kantar data provides informa-
tion, such as links to the advertising creative, that is unavailable in the 
FCC system, we concluded that the FCC system is a viable source for 
political advertising data.
Limitations of the FCC’s Public Inspection Files
Although the difficulties in searching and interpreting PDF documents 
in the FCC file system have been discussed in this article and elsewhere,32 
there are a number of other shortcomings in the FCC’s approach that 
undermine the principle of public transparency in who is financing politi-
cal advertising during election campaigns.
The FCC’s system is blind to political advertising purchased on a 
national level and then transmitted by local broadcasters. Because sta-
tions, not networks, report political purchases, there are no records in the 
FCC Public Inspection Files for network buys. In the past, most polit-
ical advertising was purchased on a market-by-market basis, but in the 
recent presidential campaign substantial sums were spent on national 
advertising purchases. Kantar Media reported that candidates Trump and 
Clinton purchased over $86 million of national advertising through the 
end of October 2016, with an additional $33 million reported as “other,” 
presumably super PACs, presumably with ads running on broadcast net-
works as well as cable television networks.33 Because of the FCC’s failure 
to track national broadcast advertising, an organization or individual can 
use the public airwaves to influence elections, but avoid public disclosure 
by purchasing advertising at the national level, rather than through local 
broadcast facilities. The absence of national-level disclosure fails to provide 
critical information to voters.
“Stealth advertising”34 in the form of advocacy outside of traditional 
commercials is a blind spot in both Kantar’s and the FCC’s systems. For 
32. See Kim; and McGehee and Moran.
33. See Dumenco.
34. As described by Cain.
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example, in 2004 Sinclair Broadcasting scheduled the anti-John Kerry 
biopic “Stolen Honor” to air on its television stations across the United 
States two weeks before the election.35 Although the FCC refused to 
take action,36 the negative publicity generated by Sinclair’s plan resulted 
in the station airing only parts of the biopic along with some pro-Kerry 
material to satisfy the equal opportunities provision of Section 315 of the 
Communications Act. Nonetheless, this example illustrates the impor-
tance of accurate disclosure and easy access to the FCC’s file system so that 
researchers and the public can effectively track political ad spending.
A third limitation of the FCC data is the absence of digital adver-
tising data. The FCC has limited jurisdiction over digital advertising, 
which is heavily used by political campaigns.37 The media planning firm 
ZenithOptimedia claims that 2016 was the last in which television adver-
tising spending on behalf of all advertisers exceeded digital advertising 
spending. Spending on digital products such as video, display, mobile, and 
search by all US advertisers overall outpaced television spending in 2017, 
and the trend is expected to continue.38 The FCC is jurisdictionally blind to 
the digital flow of advertising that goes to websites, mobile telecommuni-
cations devices, as well as billboards and other forms of paid messages that 
go from sources to the electorate, because it is beyond the agency’s scope 
of authority. For now, it is up to individual media organizations to disclose 
the sources of political advertising, such as the Facebook/Instagram plan 
announced in 2018 to provide an application program interface (API) for 
researchers and public interest groups to monitor ads tagged as “political.”39
Practical Implications for Researchers: FCC versus Kantar Data via 
the Wesleyan Media Project
Kantar-based data available through the Wesleyan Media Project provides 
multiple advantages for researchers over the FCC-derived for FEC-based 
data. The Kantar data is at the level of the individual spot, and unlike FCC 
or FEC data, each data line links to an online collection of advertising 
creative. In addition, Wesleyan Media Project summarizes the rhetorical 
35. See Rutenberg.
36. See NBC News.
37. For a review of digital advertising in recent elections, see Franklin, Ridout, and Franz.
38. See Ad Age Datacenter.
39. https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/05/q-and-a-on-ads-transparency/.
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approach of the spot: positive, negative, or comparative.40 The cost of 
accessing Kantar data via the Wesleyan Media Project is minimal at $20 
per data set.41
However, there are two salient limitations to Kantar data via the 
Wesleyan Media Project: timeliness and transparency. The Wesleyan Media 
Project releases data from Kantar after the conclusion of the  following 
election cycle. Thus, advertising data from US Senate and House races 
are available following a two-year lag, the presidency are released after a 
four-year lag. If timeliness is a factor in a research program, the delayed 
availability of Kantar data via the Wesleyan Media Project may be a hin-
drance. The second limitation is the absence of disclosure by Kantar of its 
data collection methods. Kantar does not publish its methods for collect-
ing data, nor their procedures for coding the source of the advertising.42 
If transparency of data collection methods is of value, then the absence of 
detail on Kantar-based data may be a limitation.
Methodological Limitations
This project took advantage of the extensive political advertising activ-
ity that accompanied the 2016 Iowa Presidential Caucuses. The broadcast 
television stations in the Des Moines media market are experienced in 
handling the advertising-saturated political campaigns, and thus may be 
more compliant to FCC regulations than stations in markets where polit-
ical advertising is less lucrative. Thus, the scale of advertising activities in 
the Des Moines media market may limit generalizability to other markets 
and campaigns.
We did not measure inter-coder reliability for this project, nor does 
Kantar report inter-coder reliability. Nor was there a mechanism to certify 
each FCC-derived entry. However, given the consonance between the two 
data sets, coder error seems to be a minor issue.
Our data collection ended a few days following the Iowa Caucuses. It 
is probable that ending the data collection at that time resulted in missing 
cancellation notices that were filed later with the FCC. Additionally, FCC 
rules are inconsistent in specifying the duty of stations to notify the FCC 
40. See Fowler.
41. See Wesleyan Media Project.
42. Kantar Media is not alone in its reluctance to disclose its methods. None of the adver-
tising monitoring firms listed earlier (Media Monitors, Echelon Insights, Advertising Analytics) 
publish their data collection methods.
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.218 on Tue, 15 Jan 2019 21:08:58 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Transparency in Political Advertising        439
of cancellations, allowing stations to provide only the name of a contact 
person in lieu of cancellation notifications. It is possible that the absence 
of cancellation notices was the reason for the largest gap between FCC-
derived data and Kantar reporting in this study, advertising for candidate 
Marco Rubio. Contracts in the FCC-derived database indicated the pur-
chase of over 3300 ads for Marco Rubio, whereas Kantar reported the runs 
of 1802 ads. In any case, the inclusion of cancellation notices filed after the 
end of the data collection would have served to increase the correlation 
between the FCC and Kantar’s monitoring data.
Finally, the viability of the FCC system for political advertising data 
from radio stations, cable systems, and other distribution mechanisms was 
not explored in this study, and is a question for the future.
Conclusion
This research set out to explore the usability and validity of the FCC’s 
Public Inspection File system as a source of political advertising data for 
information policy researchers, public interest groups, and others who are 
interested in knowing who is purchasing political advertising and how 
much they are spending. The FCC files are somewhat accessible, and the 
data derived from the FCC files match well to Kantar’s station surveillance 
system.
The work done by broadcasters to upload contracts is not matched by 
the FCC system’s use by researchers. As evidenced by the stream of research 
that references Kantar data, researchers want information on the source and 
quantity of political advertising. But with few exceptions, researchers have 
not accessed the FCC material. The FCC’s failure to track  national-level 
advertising, and its insistence on uploads of non-machine-readable docu-
ments, adds unnecessary opacity to the goal of transparency in the political 
use of national airwaves.
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